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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Summary
The growth of nationalized oil sales within the next
few years will test OPEC's ability to act as a cohesive
cartel. By relegating the companies to a lesser role,
the producing states may inadvertently force the creation
of a more competitive market. If OPEC is not able to
adjust to the additional economic pressures, it may have
to forego its plans to increase nationalized sales further.
These growing volumes of sale crude cut directly to
the heart of the pricing issue. The cartel's ability to
set prices and to hold them rests upon the balance between
the oil demanded and that offerred at a given time. If
more petroleum is on the market than is needed, individual
sellers will place downward pressure on prices.
In the past, the cartel has used the behavioral and
structural characteristics of the international petroleum
market to inhibit these price shadings. The international
majors have been co-opted through very profitable "par-
ticipation schemes," which have allowed them to purchase
a fraction of their offtakes below the official sale
prices. This has given them a large advantage vis-a-vis
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the "independents," who have had to purchase all their
crude at sale prices.
The participation arrangements have retarded the
majors' response to short-term crude surpluses and have
given the cartel a buffer from market forces. When excess
crude enters world systems, the sellers must offer it at
a discount. In a completely competitive environment,
buyers would rush to offtake all they could. The majors,
however, are reluctant to jeopardize their profitable
participation deals, so the quantities they take from the
fringe producers have been rather limited.
Other companies--the independents--would naturally
be attracted by this bargain crde. Because many of these
firms lack the downstream outlets to dispose of large
volumes, however, they may be unable to lift as much as
they might desire. This combination of participation
incentives and structural peculiarities has given OPEC
the ability to maintain price levels even through persis-
tent periods of "glut."
Instead of having to maintain a tight supply situ-
ation, the producing states have been relying on the majors
to allocate offtakes so that excess crude would not find
its way to product markets. Without these companies,
OPEC may be forced to monitor the members' production so
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that supply can be constrained. This would place Saudi
Arabia and other "sa er" nations in the uncomfortable
position of "residual producers."
The structure is already changing. The decreased
volume of "participation" crude is sending majors to
third party markets more frequently to meet their own
system requirements. Because they must obtain these vol-
umes at official sale prices, these companies are becoming
more sensitive to the price/value differentials offerred
by the governments. The relatively large quantities that
will move at these "arm's length" prices in the future
threaten to create dramatic swings in country-by-country
liftings.
Nationalized oil sales will reduce the buffer that
the majors have used to stabilize markets when crude costs
and values are out of line. The countries, themselves,
therefore, will have to insure that the market realiza-
tions are commensurate with the price they charge. OPEC
must be able to maintain a continuous tight supply situ-
ation--a feat which they have been able to accomplish
only for limited periods of time. The key questions to
be answered are: what will be the role of the cartel
"core"; and what dangers are likely to upset the stra-
gegic moves necessary to enforce the pricing maneuvers?
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During the next few years, the cartel will be
threatened from the outside. Large increases in output
are expected from areas such as Mexico, China, the North
Sea, and other non-OPEC countries. This supply situation
could be exacerbated by "flat out" production by Algeria,
Indonesia, and the rest of the "spender" nations. Because
of price increases and conservation consciousness, demand
growth for crude is expected to abate somewhat over the
next decade and will add further to the possibilities of
a glut.
In view of this environment, the cartel core will
have to slash output in order to keep unneeded oil off
world markets. The revolution in Iran has lessened the
producers' difficulties for the moment by taking three
million barrels per day out of supply markets. The long
term outlook, however, is still uncertain. The core's
ability to curtail output for an extended period of time
is limited by the need to generate revenues necessary for
internal economic development.
If the cartel cannot maintain the tight supply
needed to support a nationalized sales program, OPEC will
have to find another way to maintain price levels and
give the residual producers the necessary income. Among
the better alternatives open to OPEC is the old system in
which the major international companies acted as the
countries' agents and performed the cartel's allocation
duties. This would imply a decline in the relative impor-
tance of nationalized sales and a resurgence of some of
the majors' former power. Unless the cartel can adjust
to the strains brought on by the nationalized sales,
therefore, the recent trend may be simply a passing
phenomenon,
Background
Up until the 1960's, the international majors con-
trolled the production and marketing phases of world oil.
Their presence promoted the stability of prices and volumes
on which both consuming and producing nations learned to
depend. Their fundamental strengths were derived from
access to low cost crude and the downstream networks
necessary to move the output.
When other companies, known as "independents,"
acquired cheap Libyan crude during the Sixties, the majors
began to lose their control on world markets. The extreme-
ly profitable concession agreements gave the independents
the ability to establish downstream market positions.
Since these volumes passed outside of the majors' systems,
their ability to allocate global production was inhibited.
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The excess crude situation, of course, caused prices to
decline. This environment led to the well-known Teheran
and Tripoli agreements in which the OPEC states began to
assert their power.
OPEC raised crude prices in 1973/74 and assumed
responsibility for most production decisions, but did not
attempt to remove the majors from their favorable economic
arrangements. The cartel recognized the need for these
companies to have strong downstream positions so that
they could help control problems encountered with excess
crude.
It was no accident that most of the incentives that
originally drew the newcomers were smothered. The attrac-
tive concession agreements that brought companies such as
Occidental into Libya and other producing states are now
gone.2 During many of the past few years, it has been
uneconomic to run incremental purchase crude in refiner-
ies.3 This entire price structure has been designed by
the OPEC nations so that the prime participants in down-
stream activities will be the international majors.
The cartel has harnessed their downstream strengths
through the participation agreements. The majors match
the volumes demanded in product markets with available
crude supplies. The participation deals insure that these
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crude volumes will not be sourced from countries attempt-
ing to boost sales by shading prices. The companies would
be reluctant to lose their favored status by pursuing the
most profitable short-term purchases which would increase
the volatility of offtakes and antagonize their producer
partners.4
Because of changes in the structure of the market,
however, the system may lose some of its former stability.
The percentage of equity crude for the majors has been
dropping steadily as nationalized oil sales have grown.
At a given price differential between "equity" and "sale"
crude, the heavier bias toward sale volumes will force the
majors' verage acquisition costs toward the third party
price. Due to this divorce from the producing states,
these firms will have less to lose by reacting sooner to
changes in operating economics than ever before.
By disfranchising these companies from participation
arrangements, the producing states may force the majors
into becoming merely large independents. The structural
and behavioral characteristics of the market woula be
changed so that all companies will react quickly to changes
in incremental economics. Their role would be to match
the price/realization relationships in product markets
with the cost/value relationships in supply markets.
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If the cartel is to maintain its economic power in
this environment, it will have to find alternative methods
of enforcing price hikes or give up its attempt to increase
nationalized oil sales. The development of any new system
will be heavily influenced by the future sources of crude
supply and by the degree of competition OPEC encourages by
its sales actions.
Analysis
The thesis will evaluate the eventual impact of
nationalized oil sales on OPEC's pricing ability. Chap-
ters II and III will analyze the historic relationships
of companies and producing states as they pertain to the
changing pattern of crude distribution. Chapters IV and
V project the impact OPEC's policies will have on the
international petroleum system if current trends continue.
Chapter II focuses on the development of the National
Oil Companies NOC's) and the underlying relation to the
new demands placed on OPEC's pricing structure. The in-
creased dependence on "sale crude" will force the produc-
ing states to become more aware of tne value of their oil
relative to its price. If it is to maintain a NOC sales
program, OPEC must insure that the "net-back" values
remain above the contract sales price.
The analysis begins with a quantitative lock at the
growth of international crude sold outside the channels
of the majors. These NOC sales have reduced the volume
of participation crude available to the majors under
preferential terms. The economic effects of these actions
are illustrated by examining European market trends since
the early 1970's.
Chapter III examines the motives that drive the
firms to make certain allocation and procurement deci-
sions. The majors make profits on their liftings of
equity crude, and thus can be expected to move slowly in
response to changes in spot value. Nevertheless, these
firms will eventually adjust thir programs to accommodate
the most "economic" crude slate. The majors' exposure to
third party markets for system needs will reinforce the
motivation to modify lifting schedules.
In view of these companies' expected behavior, it
is unrealistic to assume that they will be able to assist
the cartel in maintaining price levels or in controlling
production levels. OPEC's problems will be amplified by
the possible return of the independents with access to
profitable crude. The advent of these competitive markets
would necessarily imply that the producing states would
have to hold prices high entirely through their own actions
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and without any help from the companies.
Proof that the different companies actually affect
markets as hypothesized would substantiate the argument
that OPEC has been placed in a tenuous position with in-
creased NOC sales. In order to show that these economic
relationships hold, two tests were devised: one for the
majors and one for the independents. Liftings from sev-
eral countries are examined for any evidence of variance
that could be explained by the companies' behavior.
Chapter IV addresses the issue of how far the cartel
core must cut output to maintain a tight supply. The key
parameters are: (11 the demand expected from consuming
nations; C21 the additional output coming from non-cartel
sources (i,e. Mexicol; and (3) the actions of the cartel
core members. Any drop in demand relative to non-core
supply must be met by production cuts by the core.
The simulations will be based on a supply/demand
model currently being developed by the World Oil Project
at M.I,T. The residual demand to be met by the core can
be viewed against several different supply scenarios.
Chapter V assesses the problems inherent in pursuing
this "residual producer" strategy. Financial constraints
determined by internal development needs will interfere
with the curtailment of production. The simulation model
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of Chapter IV will be used in tandem with projections of
the core s current acount balances to examine how severe
the problems will be.
Chapter VI is an analysis of the options open to
the cartel. The conclusions are based upon the trends
and forecasts developed in earlier chapters.
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Chapter I Footnotes
1. Sampson, Anthony, The Seven Sisters, Bantam Books,
1976, p. 185.
2. Petroleum Economics, Limited, Technical Analysis of
the International Oil Market, June 1978, p. 14.
3. Department of Energy, An Analysis of Current Trends
in United States Access to World Oil, July 1, 1978,
p. 15.
4. Ibid, Tab 4, p.2 .
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CHAPTER II
RISE OF THE NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES
The advent of the national oil companies (NOC's) is
changing the structure and economics of the entire industry.
In the past, the international majors controlled most of
the allocation and distribution of the world's petroleum
so that it passed through to markets within secure net-
works.1 In selling its own crude, OPEC has restricted the
powers of the majors and has forced a change in the manner
in which oil gets to markets.
OPEC created these national outlets when the coun-
tries moved to assume control oer their petroleum indus-
tries. As a matter of long-term policy, most of these
producer-based NOC's seek increases in their direct for-
eign sales as well as an expansion of their role in
2
ancillary marketing activities. The direct results of
this trend are twofold: (1) more crude will reach third
parties outside of the established channels of the majors;
and 2) this oil will reach markets at official "sale"
prices rather than at the reduced levels available to
former concessionaires.
The increase of open market purchases will engender
heightened sensitivity to the price/value relationship
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of each country's crude. Over the long term, the "netted-
back" value of a composite barrel of products must remain
above the cost of the oil if the NOC's expect to maintain
a direct sale system. In recent years, this has not been
the case, as the average costs of incremental purchase,
shipping, and refining have exceeded the product reali-
zations.
In order to maintain high market values, OPEC will
have to control output now that NOC sales constitute most
of the trade in world oil. The decline in relative impor-
tance of the majors signals that they will no longer be
able to insulate the cartel from product markets as they
once did. Key to OPEC's future will be the competitive
economics that will develop among the firms and the
policies the cartel will pursue to compensate for the
changes in market structure.
Types of NOC's
As a result of local expertise, nationalistic fer-
vor, or a myriad of other factors, NOC's have developed
along several different lines. The degree to which in-
creases in direct sales will affect world markets will
depend largely upon the historical relationships that
have existed between the majors and the individual coun-
tries.
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A Type I NOC can be thought of as handling its own
sales of crude and of products from domestic refineries.3
These companies are usually found in the more "radical."
states which nationalized their industries sometime in
the past. Examples of this genre are: Iraq National
Oil Company (INOC); Sonatrach (Algeria); Pemex (Mexico);
and Petroleos de Venezuela.
As may be expected, the relationships of Type I
NOC's with the world oil community are predominantly on
an arm's length basis. All sales are made at a fixed
price (more or less), and so far as is publicly known,
the majors are not given any relative advantages.
Increascs in volume will not dramatically impact the
majors and their market structure unless the additional
production represents a large absolute quantity vis-a-vis
world supply.
Countries whose NOC's handle a substantial volume
themselves but still use the former concessionaires to a
considerable extent would be classified as Type II.
The state firms maintain strict control over most produc-
tion and investment decisions, but maintain close ties
with the majors through "advisory contracts" or partici-
pation agreements. These companies include: National
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC, pre-1979); Libyan National Oil
-19-
Company (Linoco); Pertamina (Indonesia); CEPE (Ecuador);
and others.
The Type III NOC s operate largely through manage-
ment of the majors, who receive special participation in-
centives vis-a-vis the independent purchasers. This type
of arrangement helps to bind the interest of the NOC and
major together. Examples of Type III are: Saudi Arabia;
the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms; and Gabon.
The key structural relationships lie between the
majors and the Type II and III NOC's. Since the companies
have been allowed to lift crude at an average cost that is
lower than the sale price, they have had incentives to
lend stability to the system. The extra profit margin
shielded them from the vagaries of product prices, so
that they were not forced to alter their sources of supply.
The countries, in return, were given a fairly dependable
outlet for their crude. As long as the participation
percentage of total world oil supply remains at "high"
levels, the system can maintain its strength.
Even Type III NOCts, however, have begun to change
their policies recently. Although they use the former
concessionaires as their main offtakers for security of
outlet, countries such as Abu Dhabi have been generally
increasing their direct sales to all comers, Further,
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Saudi Arabia and Qatar have stepped up sales to other
governments such as Brazil and France.5 These deals
necessarily imply that the majors" relative importance
is waning and that they are losing their aggregate incen-
tives to cooperate with the NOC's.
NOC's and Crude Disposal
NOC crude has been on world markets for over forty
years. Yet the volumes of this trade have been insignif-
icant relative to those moving within the majors' system.
The new wave of NOC sales, however, does appear to have
the potential to alter the means of disposal drastically.
NC disposal can be defined within the framework
of the international oil market. The world oil trade is
a system linking the product markets of North America,
Western Europe, and Asia with the producing states of the
world. Volumes produced in North America are not in-
cluded, since the region is a net consumer and few barrels
leave the continent.
The products traded internationally are generally:
(1) channeled through the majors' systems (including
crude for the U.S. market); 2) sold to independents and
other companies; or C3) constuned locally by the producing
states. The key-parameter on the sales side is the quan-
tity of products sold by the major companies, This serves
as an indicator of these firms' relative strength when
compared'with their volume of crude available.
The crude reaching the markets is usually: (1)
owned (equity) by the oil companies; (2) sold under spe-
cial "buy-back" or participation arrangements; or (3)
sold in spot or long-term contracts by NOC's. The first
two sources have historically provided the majority of
oil to the product markets and have been controlled by.
the majors. They distributed the crude in excess of
their product selling capabilities under long-term con-
tract to independent refineries. The shift toward NOC
sources will alter these relationships and place added
burdens upon the producing states to constrain supplies.
NOC sales have been increasing for several years
CFigure 2.1). These volumes, which are the difference
between international demand and majors' sources, are
reaching record levels and represent about half of the
entire free world trade, Since the oil markets have
remained intact, one may conclude that the eventual impact
of the upward trend in nationalized sales is marginal.
The growth in sales alone, however, is not the only
key factor in the expected change, The act of increasing
state sales automatically cuts into the crude available
to the majors under preferential terms. To the extent
that the "participation" crude is in excess of product
marketing requirements, these companies have a buffer
against changes in operating policies. Over time, they
will merely reduce the crude to third parties under long-
term contracts. As the situation worsens and the majors
become "crude short," however, their operating decisions
will be more oriented towards meeting system requirements.
The crude sold outside the channels of the majors
has grown in recent years (Table 2.1). The net figures
are calculated by subtracting the companies' equity and
participation production per country (Tables 2.2 A-E)
from the total production of eachl country (BP Statistical
Review). Much of the recent growth in NOC sales has come
from Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Iran, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia.
These countries have provided the majors with a large
proportion of their crude requirements in the past. By
selling more crude on the open market, these states have
cut directly into the excess supply of the majors.
The extent of these changes on the crude surplus
varies from company to company (Tables 2.2 A-E). Over
Sohio is included as a result of its recent acqui-
sition by BP. Occidental, Continental, ARCO, and Mara-
thon are included because of their long-term arrangements
with some proucer states.
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the five year period, the crude available to virtually
every one of these companies has decreased, as indicated
by the trend in total company crude production. The
impacts were most pronounced for BP, Gulf, and Royal
Dutch, which had relied on countries bent on increasing
their marketing abilities--Kuwait and Iran,
During this period when the majors' crude sources
were drying up, their marketing requirements were not
reduced nearly as far (Table 2.3). The difference between
the crude production figures and product sales represents
the net crude surplus for each of the companies (Table
2.4). The majors as a group fell from a net surplus of
four to five million barrels per day to almost nothing
over the period of study. It is this result which is
important for world oil, as the allocation powers are
passing from the major internationals to the producer
states,
The NOC's will replace the international companies
as marketers of the "marginal crude" on world systems.
The disposal of these last barrels is key to the pricing
ability of OPEC. Because the supply/demand balance on
the margin determines the spot crude price, the producing
states must be able to restrict production so that the
value remains above the official price.
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Some analysts have attempted to show that NOC in-
creases have had no significant effects on world markets,
as the volumes have had to be distributed in much the
same manner as they always have, Through a series of
approximations, the Petroleum Economics study "proved"
that the overall volume of crude moving through inte-
grated channels has not changed since 1970:
Net Volume of Crude Moving to:
Integrated' Operations Third Parties
1970 79% 21%
1975 78% 22%
This analysis paints a different picture than that sug-
gested in Tables 22 (A-E), Petroleum Economics did not
remove the crude purchased in open markets by some of
the Integrated Operators, Their results are more appro-
priate as a description of the extent of downstream con-
trol of the majors, since the basis of analysis is really
the crude passing through integrated channels to marketing
outlets.
The report, therefore, does nt evaluate the declin-
ing percentage of marketing requirements filled by "owned"
crude. The percentage of crude moving to integrated oper-
ations is artificially high and masks the potential loss
of stability in the marketplace;
The study makes a more fundamental error in over-
looking the key factors of value and relative economics
and how they mesh with the disposal of crude. They did
correctly assess the ownership of production and refining
capacity and incorporate deals such as "participation/
buy back," "long-term sales," and "royalty," but omitted
the impact these arrangements have on the companies'
decision processes and incentives. In order to under-
stand the importance of the recent changes in the oil
industry, it is essential to examine what the cost of
crude really means to a company.
Value vs. Cost
The increased volumes of NOC sales has created sys-
tem crude shortages for the majors. As a result, more
companies have become exposed to third party crude mar-
kets in which they must buy directly from the producer
states at official sale prices. Purchases of this oil,
therefore, will be largely a function of the market
prices of the products vis-a-vis the company costs of
acquiring the crude.
The value ex-refinery is the sum of the realiza-
tions on a composite barrel of the products the oil will
yield, A typical yield structure for an average crude in
a European refinery is shown in Table 2.5. This barrel
of crude will become 20% gasoline, 10% kerosene, and so
on. By multiplying the 20% gasoline fraction by the pro-
duct price, we can estimate the realization on that part
of the barrel. Summing these realizations for a three
week period in Rotterdam gives the "value" of that crude.
Before the oil gets to the product markets, however,
the companies incur costs of refining and transportation.
The value of the composite barrel of products must be re-
duced by a representative refining margin and the spot
freight from the point of origin to the refinery.7 The
result is the F.O.B, value of the crude on an absolute
scale and represents what an average company can afford
to pay.
This value can then be compared with the actual
costs of acquiring the crude. Purchases in third party
markets from the NOC's will usually be made at the offi-
cial sale price. Although there may be discounts or
premia attached to long-term contracts, the list price
usually gives a reasonable objective approximation of
the terms of the transaction.
Participation agreements have given the majors offi-
cial discounts off the sale price on a certain percentage
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of their offtakes. Petroleum Intelligence Weeklyhas cal-
culated the average acquisition costs for several key
crudes based on the percentage of production at the
official sale price and that at the participation price.
The difference between this figure and the official sale
price gives an indication of the majors' incentives
vis-a-vis independents (Table 2.6) .
These low average acquisition prices result in
fundamentally different profit opportunities for the
majors than for the independents. Decisions based on
the costs of supply, therefore, will necessarily be
colored by the extra margins. The growth of NOC sales,
however, has created a situation in which the companies
are exposed to third party prices on the last barrels
into their systems. The effects on their behavior will
be almost as if the firms had to buy all their crude on
the open market.
Operating economics in the oil industry center
around running an "incremental barrel" through the sys-
tem,. The companies use this evaluation tool to decide
whether or not to expand volume or to trade one crude
off against another. Because the last barrels into
the system will be NOC sale crude, the companies will
balk if the oil's value were significantly less than
the official price.
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The large volumes which will be involved in these
margin transactions have the potential to upset market
equilibria. In periods of poor product realizations,
many cartel members may find their output reduced in-
voluntarily. By placing these majors in a position
where they will be sensitive to the tight margins be-
tween value and official price, the OPEC states have
weakened the companies' abilities to withstand market
fluctuations. This, in turn, will place added strain
on OPEC's pricing ability.
Relation to Markets
The source of OPEC's mystique is its ability to
raise the price of oil. Its original success was due
largely to the participation arrangements with the
majors. The lowered cost of crude gave these companies
the ability to withstand periods of poor market condi-
tions without putting pressure on the cartel members.
The large quantities of NOC crude on world markets,
however, may hinder the cartel's ability to maintain
increases, The companies' increased sensitivity to
incremental economics will force OPEC to sustain price
hikes entirely through its own actions.
OPEC's price increases have been achieved by re-
stricting output so that excess demand bids up product
prices to record levels. The embargo in late 1973 cre-
ated shortages that sent spot prices in Rotterdam
through the roof (Figure 2.2). OPEC then raised its
crude prices in order to capture most of the gain in
realizations. It appears as if the cartel is allowing
the Iranian crisis to boost spot prices again so that
they can follow with a substantial increase in the crude
price.
During periods in which prices increase this dras-
tically, markets reflect the instability caused by in-
correct 'valuing" of relative crude prices. Figure 2.3
shows the realization/average cost pattern over a ten
year period spanning the embargo. For most of the peri-
od after the supply shortages, realizations appear to
have fallen below the average costs of acquisition,
transport, and refining.9 The data is not sufficiently
precise to ascertain the exact levels of loss, but the
consistently negative margins would indicate that com-
panies at best made very low profits on NOC sale crude.
Incremental economics would suggest that this
should never occur. Companies would cut back on the
most unprofitable liftings until the reduced supply
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raised prices to levels commensurate with the cost of
crude. Some of this equalization never occurred in
product markets, however.
These companies were given enough of a margin to
have the flexibility to wait until product realizations
eventually returned to profitable levels for incremental
crude. They were not forced to drop liftings or pres-
sure the producers into backing down off their price
demands. The majors' loss of excess crude, however,
changes the economics of the international oil market
and reduces the likelihood of the companies' continued
ability to "ride through" turbulent markets.
If the companies are no longer able to insulate
the majors from market forces, liftings may be reduced
for the most uneconomic crudes to the extent possible.
This automatic market equilibration may increase pro-
duct realizations at the expense of market share, but
it also may reduce the sales of countries badly in need
of revenues. The result could be a series of price
shadings through which the original price increase
would be lost.
The next chapter will examine the means by which
the companies react to market stimuli and measure the
magnitude of the effects. Because these firms do adjust
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to changes in relative economics, OPEC will have to
control its output and pricing policies to accommodate
the competitive environment NOC sales have created.
Chapter II Footnotes
1. Sampson, op.cit., p. 70
2. Analysis of Current Trends, op.cit., Tab 1, p. 4.
3. Petroleum Economics, op.cit., p. 21.
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ibid, p. 36.
7. Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, March 7, 1979, p. 4.
8. Petroleum Economics, op.cit., p. 6.
9. Analysis of Current Trends, op.cit., Tab 3, pp. 8,9.
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CHAPTER III
OIL COMPANIES AND THEIR INCENTIVES
The oil companies have historically been the bond
between the owners of reserves and the ultimate consum-
ers. They have provided the vehicle by which the OPEC
states can be assured of a steady revenue flow and have
shielded the countries from the vagaries of the market.
The companies have had incentives thus far to act in the
best interests of the producing states and have indirect-
ly helped the OPEC countries exert market influence.
In Chapter II, we showed that the structure of
this industry is changing in response to new demands
by some OPEC members, The effects of these changes
should be reflected in the motivations which drive the
oil companies and in their subsequent behavior. These
new actions will foster a more competitive, dynamic
environment with which OPEC will have to deal if it is
to maintain its dominant position.
The firms have always reacted to changes in com-
petitive economics. The growth in NOC sales, however,
has altered the fundamental environment for these firms.
The majors have become exposed to third party markets
for the first time. Independents may be able to re-
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establish downstream marketing positions and increase
product sales due to the return of low cost crude.
These factors will increase the magnitude and quickness
of reaction to changes in relative incentives.
In order to assess these potential effects, it
will be necessary to examine the past relationship of
company offtakes to the spread between value and cost.
Because of the differences in opportunities for the
majors and independents, we have devised tests that
illustrate the companies' behavior. We attempted to
show that the majors respond to relative incentives
over a long period of time and that the independents
react more quickly to similar opportunities. Further-
more, we tried to prove that the reactions themselves
have become more "competitive" since the NOC sales
began to edge out the majors' excess crude.
The strength of the results indicates that in-
creased NOC sales will create a situation in which a
relatively large percentage of world production will be
subject to rapid fluctuations in offtake. If OPEC is
to avoid this problem, the cartel must reduce NOC sales
or hold production levels down so that the value will
remain above the incremental sale price.
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The Role of the Companies
The international majors and the independents move
oil from far-off fields to consumer markets. Their long-
term behavior is governed by the economic incentives
each is given to produce, transport, refine, and sell
petroleum. Collectively, these participants and their
actions comprise the "structure" of the international
petroleum market.
Each group, however, acts in its own peculiar man-
ner and is guided by different environmental considera-
tions. An understanding of the factors which influence
the behavior patterns will make it possible to monitor
performance in the marketplace,
The International Majors may have fallen from
power, but continue to have an important role as pur-
veyors of oil. These companies--Exxon, Royal Dutch/
Shell, Mobil, Standard Oil of California, Texaco, Gulf,
BP, and CFP--provide both the physical ability to refine,
transport, and distribute the mainstream volumes of oil
flowing in international trade and the operational exper-
tise to handle such trade, They arc differentiated from
the second tier of companies such as Continental and
Marathon by their downstream sales strength in virtually
all product markets. The associated ability to move
crude within totally integrated systems all the way to the
ultimate consumer gives these majors the wherewithal to
provide a stabilizing influence for the market.
The majors will continue to lift crude, even if the
offtakes are uneconomic in the short term. Because they
are given special participation privileges by the OPEC
states, the companies will be reticent to sacrifice long-
term strengths for relatively small present profits.
These firms have adequate cash flow from other activities,
such as North Sea production, so that they can cover their
marginal operations by "averaging" out between markets. 2
This gives them the flexibility to take a strategic per-
spective on country-by-country liftings.
Over time, the majors will adjust their crude
slates to obtain more favorable economics. They will
examine the relative incentives of one source over
another to find the most profitable crude mix that satis-
fies their marketing requirements. At first, the com-
panies will overlift or underlift their allotted volumes
by shifting the offtake schedules. If the differentials
persist over a longer period (more than a year or two),
these firms may slash the actual magnitudes of nominated
volumes.
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The adjustments made in the liftings, however, will
only be directional. Contract provisions require the com-
panies to maintain a certain base offtake program over a
period of time, If the firms allowed their liftings to
drop below this minimum level, they would risk alienating
the producing state. A strategic perspective would demand
that the company pursue a policy that maintains good rap-
port with the OPEC members, even though short-term profits
may be sacrificed.
The trade-offs between long- and short-term returns
will become more pronounced as the OPEC states move toward
increasing NOC sales to third parties. Since the majors'
systems will become more exposed to open market purchases;
these firms may be less reluctant to curtail entire off-
take programs in the future. Over time, the companies
should become more responsive to changes in incentives
and should alter their crude slates more frequently,
The majors are evolving toward positions where they
will rely solely on their strengths as masters of logis-
tical networks and as refiners and marketers. The pace
at which they move will be dictated by the decisions the
OPEC nations make on "acquisition cost" and NOC sales,
If the evolution is allowed to continue, OPEC will lose
the majors as buffer agents to shield the cartel from
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external market pressures.
Independents are companies whose size and scope of
operations'do not compare with those of the major firms.
These companies, such as Atlantic Richfield and Continen-
tal, have recently been relegated to one or two of the
three main phases of the international industry. Unlike
the fully integrated and balanced majors, they either have
to buy crude and/or products, sell crude to refiners at
arm's length prices, or sell products to bulk operators.3
These companies, however, have the flexibility to return
to more integrated operations if they are given more favor-
able incentives by the producer states.
The independents derive their strength from greater
maneuverability and speed of decision-making than the
majors. Their presence can be evidenced by periods of
heightened market activity whenever incremental crude
became profitable, such as in the European markets of
the 1960's. Until recently, OPEC effectively impeded
these companies' operations by pricing sale crude over
its value. It appears, however, as if there is a gen-
eral trend in worldwide crude prices that will make
operations profitable for the independents once more.
The potential return of the independents and the
changed role of the majors may create an environment
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inimical to the best interests of OPEC. The emphasis in
the industry will shift from a strategic perspective cen-
tered on perceived commonality of economic goals between
the majors and the cartel to one of short-term response
to changes in relative incentives. This will place added
pressure on OPEC to maintain profitable price/value rela-
tionships in order to avoid possible volatility in off-
take volumes.
Incentives and the Majors
In Chapter II, we discussed the concept "value vs.
cost" that dominates the supply side economics. Decisions
in the industry are based upon the "incremental barrel,"
which will be purchased at the official sale price. The
correct notion of incentive for both majors and inde-
pendents, therefore, is the difference between the net-
back value and the sale price.
The presence of a positive incentive for purchasing
a crude type should be correlated with an increase in
that country's NOC sales, and vice versa. In reality,
the companies are tied to volumes under long-term con-
tracts, so that the liftings should never actually go to
zero. If there is a persistent disincentive, however,
we can expect production levels to fall as companies
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postpone their liftings.
This framework is useful in evaluating the effects
of growing NOC sales on the actions of the majors. If it
can be shown that these companies adjusted offtake vol-
umes in response to relative incentives during periods
of excess system crude, it follows that the reactions
will be more severe in the upcoming years of shortage
since larger volumes will be purchased from the NOC's
than ever before.
In order to assess these responses, it is necessary
to devise a test that incorporates criteria relevant to
the majors. The concept of value, however. is difficult
to quantify, The majors do not respond to absolute net-
backs, but rather to "alternate," or relative value.
Most non-U.S. refineries have been designed around a set
percentage of Arab Light. Any changes in economics are
usually measured against this basic crude or equivalent)
and other oils are run or backed-out accordingly. A
concept of value that measures the worth of crudes vis-
a-vis Arab Light would go a long way toward capturing an
important aspect of the major's decision-making process.
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly has calculated this
value since the beginning of 1975. Except for Venezuelan
crudes, the values have been measured in Rotterdam prices
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(Table 3.1). Because Rotterdam is considered to be the
most efficient, competitive market in the world, the
numbers are probably more reliable than those obtained
from the Caribbean or Singapore. The "value" of Saudi
Light is defined as its official price and all other
values are slated in reference to it. These figures may
be compared with the official prices for the same crudes
(Table 3.2).
The difference between these two numbers will be
the majors' incentive to run a crude instead of Arab
Light (Table 3.3). Given that the supply of each crude
type is limited, it is of little importance that most of
these oils bear disincentives against Arab Light per se.
What is important is the relative incentive of a crude
compared with the other opportunities at hand. For an
individual firm, the opportunities would be the selection
of one of a few other crudes available. On a worldwide
scale, however, we need an index that represents the
average value of all the crudes moving in international
trade,
We can approximate this index--the "trade weighted
incentive"--by multiplying the percentage of world volume
supplied by each country by the incentive of a represen-
tative crude of that nation (Table 3.4). The difference
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between the country incentive (Table 3.3) and the trade
weighted one is the relative incentive for that crude in
Rotterdam (Table 3.5).
This relative incentive gives the most accurate indi-
cation of the profitability of crudes we can obtain. Not
only does the measure conform to the alternate value deci-
sion process of the majors, but it escapes the data prob-
lems inherent in the absolute incentives. The inaccuracies
in data reported on product values and the inconsistencies
in methods of calculation may bias a single value. Be-
cause the relative incentive is the difference of two
such values, these inaccuracies would tend to "wash out."
The international majors' reactions to these rela-
tive economics, however, is not usually immediate. Since
they set their crude slates six months in advance, the
most common short-term response is to move up or postpone
offtakes. If any discernable patterns are to be observed,
therefore, the majors must be given time to respond.
Relative incentives should persist as positive or
negative for at least two quarters in order to have sub-
stantial effects, For this reason, it is probably best
to use a two quarter moving average for the relative
incentives of the crudes, Similarly, it takes time for
the majors to significantly adjust their liftings. A
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three quarter moving average, centered on the second value,
would be the most appropriate measure. This permits exam-
ination of the current and past quarters--the period con-
current with that of the value measurement--as well as
the effects of present values on future liftings. These
time lags were used to make comparison tests for three
OPEC nations: Iraq, Libya, and Nigeria.
Iraq has nationalized virtually all of its produc-
tion under the auspices of INOC. Crude sales, therefore,
should be expected to carry a positive incentive over
most periods since majors are given no equity percentage.
Kirkuk, Iraq's "representative crude, ' however, has been
carrying a disincentive for almost the entire period of
study.
This apparent anomaly is merely a misrepresentation
caused by political pressure. As an OPEC "hawk," Iraq
has kept its "official" government take up with the other
Arab nations. OPEC members have expressed suspicion of
Iraq's sales deals which have permitted it to increase
offtakes in the face of limited total demand growth. The
general consensus is that INOC gives discounts and extra
credit to big, steady buyers.
Most discounts are in the form of "cents off" pur-
chases or credit terms, so that the apparent disincentives
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would actually disappear. These discounts should not bias
the Iraqi analysis, however, as most additional offtakes
are probably purchased at the official price. Since these
marginal liftings may be added or postponed, the relative
incentive captures the relevant decision criteria of the
majors when they examine Iraq vis-a-vis other producers.
Table 3.6 shows the calculation of the moving aver-
ages for both production and relative incentives. Almost
without exception, liftings increased in periods when the
relative incentive was positive and decreased when it was
negative (Figure 3.1). This implies that the majors were
responding to relative economics by increasing offtakes
over those taken in the previouq quarter when the incen-
tive was positive and vice versa, In a purely competi-
tive environment, all points should lie in quadrants I
and III since positive (negative) relative incentives
should be correlated with increased (decreased) liftings.
The "outlier," which represents a small volume decrease
with a positive incentive, occurred chronologically after
two very large consecutive increases (Table 3.6). This
is a normal phenomenon and may reflect some readjustings
of liftings as well as minor errors in data.
Iraq is as clear-cut a case as we have. Although
INOC probably cuts prices, the majors are not given equity
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participation and are not bound to long-term commitments.
The companies have been responsive to changes in economics
over time and have adjusted their liftings accordingly.
As NOC sales increase, the incentive/production relation-
ships for other nations will approach the Iraqi example.
Libya represents a Type II country in which the
former concessionaires are still present and receive a
percentage of equity crude. There is no penalty on the
companies for underlifting slated volumes, so the govern-
ment has reserved the right to sell to non-concessionaires
any oil not taken under the entitlements. As a conse-
quence of this relatively flexible concessionary system,
Linoco production is intimately related to fluctuations
in the world oil market, Over the years, in fact,
Libya's prices have responded to market trends faster and
with more precision than those of most other governments. 5
In view of these policies, we would expect Libyan
production to be responsive to changes in its market
value. The relation of Linoco sales to these incentives
since 1975 has been strong (Table 3.7 and Figure 3.2).
As with the Iraqi relationships, the data points fall
primarily in quadrants I and III. There are, however,
three periods in which production increased while rela-
tive incentives were negative. When the economics
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started to deteriorate in 1977, the companies still in-
creased their offtakes and did not let them decline until
the incentives had remained negative for some time.
Even though there was a disincentive to lift Libyan
crudes instead of other types, some companies probably
believed that it would be corrected in short order. Dis-
counts off list price and fear of losing participation
privileges delayed the response time almost a year. It
was not until the situation persisted that the majors
realized that they were in a losing position and began to
cut offtakes.
If the companies had been required to purchase crude
from Linr.co at official sale prices, the liftings would
probably not have run counter to the relative incentives.
Libya would have been forced to back down off its price
demands sooner or face a serious decline in output. The
excess system crude that damped'the response is disap-
pearing as NOC sales continue to increase. Without this
buffer, Libyan offtakes will be kept in line with the
relative incentives,
Nigeria provides an interesting example of a Type
IIIcountry. The companies have been retained to market
virtually all the crude, and have been given fairly large
incentives vis-a-vis the independents (Table 2.6).
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Nigerian production, however, has recently had a very
stormy history due to government policies aimed at rais-
ing revenues by increasing the official price postings.
The relationship between output and value is
slightly out of line CTable 3,8 and Figure 3.3). During
1976, the country raised company costs three times via
the price posting and higher buy-back mechanism, Even
after this occurred, however, sales continued to climb.
It was not until 1977 that the companies cut back on
liftings in response to competitive economics. 6 The
delay is reflected in Figure 3.3 as the two outliers
in the second quadrant,
The majors t eventual actions were drastic enough
to reduce Nigerian output to 75% of its previous high.
NNOC was then forced to back off on its aggressive pric-
ing policies and to reinstate favorable economics. As
with Libya, the companies' reactions would have probably
come sooner if they had been in third party crude markets
at the time.
The Libyan and Nigerian examples demonstrate that
participation agreements and excess supply crude have
blunted competitive responses over the past few years.
Because the majors purchased incremental barrels from
these countries at the comparatively low acquisition
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cost, they were not compelled to change their offtake
programs immediately. The slow reactions gave the OPEC
states time to adjust their pricing structure and helped
insulate the cartel from the rapid fluctuations in mar-
ket value.
Acceleration of Majors' Response
The majors have been insulated from poor market
realizations by participation crude. The loss of this
oil forces them to enter third party markets in order to
cover their system requirements. This need to purchase
incremental sale crude should create an environment in
which te majors change lifting programs as incentives
change. If we can show that the majors have begun to
change their programs sooner, we can infer that the car-
tel has lost the luxury of delays in response time it
once enjoyed.
We would like to create an index that measures the
degree of response change in liftings) relative to the
inducement (relative incentive1. This can then be plotted
against time to capture any recent trends. From the ear-
lier analysis in this chapter, we have the data plotted
on Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. If we divide the " " by
the relative incentive, we have created an index that
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captures the relevant criteria.
The trend in Iraq, for example, definitely shows
that the response has become more dramatic (Figure 3.4
and Table 3.9). Before 1977, there was no discernable
pattern in the plot. After the majors as a group began
to be crude short, however, the response in Iraq has
grown greater over time. This is demonstrated by the
monotonically increasing function since 1977 (dotted
line) .
The pattern is repeated for both Libya (Figure 3.5
and Table 3.10) and Nigeria (Figure 3.6 and Table 3.11).
The indices have become progressively larger over the
period since 1977 and are no longer negative. The nega-
tive values are from an era in which the majors still
had the strength, given by excess system crude, to ignore
incremental economics. The trend away from this non-
competitive behavior confirms the hypothesis that the
majors are being forced to react sooner.
We may infer, therefore, that the companies will
no longer buffer the producing states from market forces
by avoiding the concept "value vs. cost." The cartel
will have to insure that prices are consistently in line
with market realizations. OPEC's pricing problems will
be exacerbated by the entrance of other competitive firms
onto the world oil scene.
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Independents and Purchase Crude
Until recently, it has not been profitable for inde-
pendents to refine and sell incremental purchase crude
from many of the producing states (Figure 2.3). Their
absence from these supply markets has reduced the neces-
sity for OPEC to maintain crude prices at the levels of
the corresponding market values. This has given the car-
tel a degree of pricing flexibility it would otherwise
not enjoy since it has been protected from short-term
fluctuations in product markets.
As NOC's continue to increase their sales on third
party markets, they raise the incentives in order to
attract customers, The producers which have been moving
toward this more "competitive" stance include Libya,
Algeria, Nigeria, and the U.A.E. (Table 3.3). If more
nations follow suit, as trends suggest, and Type I NOC's
such as Pemex increase production dramatically, the stage
may be set for a resurgence of the independents.
These companies' chief strength is their speed of
decision-making. Their presence in supply markets would
create problems for OPEC's pricing ministers if product
prices started to get out of line with crude costs. The
resultant volatilities in offtake and subsequent price
shadings may make it difficult to hold a significant
price increase,
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Proof that the independents do react this quickly
to changes in incentives would reinforce the idea that
increased NOC sales are inherently dangerous for the
cartel. Since independents are active in trading mar-
kets, their actions can be monitored by examining the
differential between "spot" and "official" F.O.B. prices.
If the differential is positive, the volume of crude
sold should increase over the quarter as traders rush
to arbitrage the markets. Eventually, as markets are
brought back in line, the differentials grow smaller and
the cycle begins anew. Evidence of this relationship
would demonstrate that the independents are a real mar-
ket force,
In Libya, the changes in offtakes are closely
linked with the absolute incentives (Table 3.12 and
Figure 3,7). Some of the measured effects are undoubt-
edly due to the majors' programs, but the close corres-
pondence between arbitrage opportunities and output
variances suggests that the independents clearly are a
viable market force. Similar results can be seen in
Tdbles 3,13 and 3.14 and Figures 3,8 and 3.9 for Nigeria
and Iraq.
At present, the volumes moving in response to these
spot incentives are relatively small. Many of the inde-
-52-
pendents simply do not have established outlets for the
crude, and so the trading markets have remained "thin."
As more crudes become "economic" for long periods of
time, the independents may be able to re-enter markets
as fully integrated firms. Their renewed presence down-
stream will give these companies the wherewithal to move
enough crude to significantly affect the lifting pro-
grams of the producer states. If these independents are
as efficient as the above analysis suggests, they may
indeed be a problem for OPEC.
Implications
The increase in NOC sales has resulted in a system
where: C)1 majors have become exposed to "incremental
economics" on their third party purchases; and (2) inde-
pendents will be able to re-integrate and be able to
control more crude. Because the firms are responding
more quickly to changes in relative incentives than
before, OPEC will have to design a more robust pricing
mechanism. The objective of the producer states will
be to maintain crude values at least at the level of
their sale prices.
The only method by which the cartel can hold market
realizations at high levels and prevent volatilities in
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offtake is to restrict output. The difficulty, of course,
is that the entire environment is constantly changing.
Increased production is expected from the Type I NOC's
and from the "fringes" of the cartel, OPEC's relative
power and its ability to keep the market structure under
its wing rests on the decisions made by key producers
and the extent to which they dominate world production.
The next chapter will analyze the supply/demand
balance over the next decade. The central question to
be answered is: "How far must the OPEC core cut output
to maintain desired price/value relationships?"
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CHAPTER IV
OPEC AS "RESIDUAL PRODUCER"
Ever-growing volumes of oil are being sold on the
market by the NOC's of the OPEC countries. These sales
have crowded out crude from the majors' own systems and
have forced them to seek incremental purchase crude.
Past trends indicate that these companies react to rela-
tive incentives of one oil type vis-a-vis other alterna-
tives by increasing or decreasing offtake volumes. The
larger quantities that must be bought from the NOC's in
the future suggest that these effects will become more
pronounced and will ultimately lead to a more competitive
market system.
OPEC can adjust to this new world by controlling
either: (1) the sale prices of its crudes, both on an
absolute scale and relative to each other; or (2) the
market prices of the products. Either of these mechan-
isms, if effective, would embrace the concept "value vs.
cost" and would reduce the dangers inherent in the in-
creased NOC sales.
The first alternative is a more elaborate extension
of the existing pricing formula. OPEC has a computer
model that suggests appropriate prices for member crudes
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based on location, quality, "market price," and other
factors. The producing states use this as a guide, but
there seems to be some latitude for individual pricing
discretion. Furthermore, the simulation is not updated
frequently enough to account for random swings in pro-
duct prices.
In order to provide a method for the members to
adhere to an "objective" pricing scheme that would elimi-
nate the incentives to lift one crude over another, OPEC
would have to monitor all phases of the market and revise
the sale prices frequently. Because of the impracticali-
ties of constant price revisions and the vast arrays of
up-to-the-minute data needed for this task, an attempt
to create an accurate framework that would maintain sale
prices at the level of their product values and against
other crudes would be doomed from its inception. Models
may only provide general indications of directionality
and magnitude; markets are so complex that central price-
setting is infeasible.
The cartel, therefore, will have to control product
market prices so that net-backs will at least equal the
sale prices of its crudes, This action will dampen the
potential swings occurring from value/cost differentials
among several crudes.t In order to keep market realiza-
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tions at high levels, OPEC will have to cut output so that
excess capacity in the "wrong hands' will not create down-
ward pressure on prices,
The OPEC members--particularly the cartel "core"--
increasingly will be made to bear the brunt of supply
fluctuations in their role as residual suppliers. They
must balance the net demand of the consuming countries
with their total capacity after all other producers have
sold their desired quantities. This prevents excess vol-
umes of oil from coming onto world markets at discounts
off list price. The core itself, however, must have the
strength to reduce its output at the appropriate moments
regardless of how severe these cutbacks may be.
Role of the Residual Producer
The best method of raising petroleum prices is to
restrict production. OPEC proved that marginal cost and
competitive theories of exhaustible resources have little
to do with the price of petroleum.4 By curtailing output,
they quadrupled the crude price within a few short months.
Users of energy, motivated by fear or necessity, bid up
the last barrels on the spot market to a level that again
equilibrated supply with demand.
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The cartel optimization strategy suggested here could
be undermined if a few producers supplied extra quantities
onto world markets. Countries badly in need of additional
revenues would be tempted to throw these incremental bar-
rels into the system. In order to avoid this danger of
excess capacity, OPEC must allow its higher spenders to
produce as much as they want.
The responsibility for residual production has fal-
len upon the cartel "core": Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the
United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), and Libya. Whenever the
net demand on OPEC fell substantially below capacity,
these four nations cut back output and gave the other
nembers an opportunity to produce (Table 4.1). There
was, of course, excess capacity among the non-core coun-
tries, but it was kept low through the concerted action
of the core. During the period of the embargo and sub-
sequent price increase, excess capacity in "weak hands"
was kept under 15%. The stronger producers absorbed the
demand decrease in 1974 and allowed the other members to
enjoy comfortable export levels. Based on this observa-
tion, we may assume that 10 to 15% non-core excess capacity
is a "safe" level for periods of price increases. Greater
slack may encourage excess production during these violent
periods of adjustment.
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After the price hike had become firmly established
and worldwide demand slowed, OPEC excess capacity rose
to high levels. Although the core members absorbed a
large part of the cutback, the other producers suffered
excess capacity of 20%. During this period, the cartel
did not raise the real price of oil, possibly as a result
of this surplus capacity problem. It was not until late
1978 when Iran cut exports that the non-core excess dropped
to levels where OPEC could again raise prices.
In order to keep prices firm and rising in the
future, therefore, the cartel will have to maintain a
tight supply situation. The responsibility for this
control falls upon the "residual producers" within the
organization. They must make certain that their "firm
hands" sell the last barrels moving through the inter-
national petroleum system. Their presence as last sel-
lers will reduce the downward pressure on prices that
would exist if a revenue-hungry nation needed to increase
its output by shading its postings.
These core producers have a very delicate balancing
act indeed,, They must first decide the level of demand
sustainable in the world at a given oil price. The cal-
culation is complicated by the price/growth/energy rela-
tionships which adjust economies to energy costs-over
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time. OPEC must be wary of choking off too much consump-
tion with too steep a price trajectory.
Residual Demand
When OPEC raised the price of oil in 1973/74, it
changed many of the established relationships between
GNP growth and energy consumption. The extent of the
structural change is unclear and no economic forecaster
can predict what the future relationships will be.
Nevertheless, it is possible to approximate near-term
effects with basic assumptions about price and demand.
This demand framework can then be used to the extent to
which the cartel core will have to reduce production
levels in the future.
The most fundamental relationship deals with the
cost of energy and the quantity of its use. As the price
increases, other inputs such as labor become relatively
more economic. Over time, as machines wear out, they
will be replaced with more energy-efficient ones. Be-
cause some of the capital stock using energy is fixed
in the short term, it will take some years for the price
increase to affect demand completely.
If we assume that half of the ultimate demand de-
crease net of substitution from other energy forms will
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take place over the first five years, and that half of
the remaining decrease will occur over the next five,
we can approximate the time lags in the world economy.
This assumption will allow us to measure the price elas-
ticity of energy demand.
In 1973/74, there was a real price increase in oil
of 300%. Over the same period, net demand dropped 3.3%.
Given the "half life" assumption that this first year
decrease represents approximately 10% of the eventual
drop, we can calculate the long-run price elasticity to
be about -0,1 (Table 4.2). This implies that a 10% real
increase in price will ultimately result in a demand
level 1% lower than if there had been no price hike.
Before the embargo and new price levels, oil demand
had increased regularly at 7 to 8% per year. Since this
was about the same growth rate as that of GNP, economists
have linked the two by saying that energy had an income
elasticity of one. In the last few years, however, it
is unclear as to whether or not the relationship has
changed.
Oil consumption has been growing at a rate of about
three percent per year for the period since 1974. If we
assume that this underlying growth path will remain at or
under 3%, we can begin to construct a price-demand model.
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This necessarily begs the question of income elastici-
ties, but allows us to approximate the annual increase
in demand for oil.
The price effect captured in the half-life formula
represents the relation between energy and other inputs
in society and does not include the "shocks" caused in
consumer markets. These "blips" are short-term events
that we assume will last for one year and then disappear.
To account for these hypothesized changes, we may assume
that as price increases by 10%, demand growth will fall
by 0.5%, from 3% to 2.5%.
This rather arbitrary decision is an attempt to
account for one-time shocks introduced into the system
by an oil price rise, The effect is really to depress
the long-term growth rate slightly below 3%. Together
with the price effects, the model gives a conservative
estimate of annual petroleum demand. This lower esti-
mate is preferable since it gives a lower net residual
demand on the cartel core, If the core can keep supply
tight with this particular scenario, it can adjust with
relatively more ease to a world with higher levels of
demand ,
The model does give, therefore, a price/volume
relationship that will allow us to calculate the revenues
of the OPEC core producers under relatively "tough"
environmental conditions. By varying the price trajec-
tory, we can simulate the effects on world demand for
the next few years.
If OPEC pushes through real price increases of
$1/Barrel each year, demand will grow at slightly over
2% annually. The effects on consumption are shown in
Case A of Table 4.3. Similarly, the demand forecasts
for a high price trajectory and constant real price can
be constructed from the model (Table 4.3 B and C). The
simulations are compared with other estimates in Table
4.4.
These scenarios can be used to check the degree to
which the cartel core must restrict output in order to
maintain a tight supply situation where no cargoes are
offered in excess of world demand. Non-core production
must be subtracted from total consumption to yield net
demand on the core. The difference between this and the
existing capacity is the extent to which these four pro-
ducers must slash output.
Integrated Supply and Demand
World demand will grow at varying rates predicated
upon the price path OPEC takes. The cartel core in large
part controls this price trajectory, but must trade off
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higher receipts per barrel with lower residual demand.
This demand will depend on total non-core production
levels ,
The supply projections were derived from the M.I.T.
World Oil Project W.O.P.) model. Because of difficulties
inherent in modelling core behavior, it predicts capaci-
ties in lieu of actual production levels. In order to
convert to production figures, we can multiply total
capacity by set percentages based on a priori assumptions
about non-core behavior. The objective of the simulation
is to determine how far the cartel core must cut back to
accommodate the other producers' desires.
Most "free world" producers will produce at or near
capacity. These "price taker" countries maximize their
net revenues by producing as much oil as they can economi-
cally extract at one time. This output will be accompanied
by the net Communist exports projected by the W.O.P. model.
During 1973/74, non-core members of OPEC were able
to absorb about 10-15% excess capacity. A production
level of 90% of expected capacity, therefore, would be
in line with past experience for these countries. More
surplus may engender a situation where the nations are
tempted to increase NOC sales by reducing the effective
price,
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These conditions would create an environment in
which the cartel core would have to operate under some
duress. The model will give a conservative estimate of
residual demand, so that the strains may be slightly
amplified. It will thus help to illustrate the hard
choices faced by OPEC planners.
The first case was run under assumptions of con-
stant real prices and pre-revolution Iranian production
trends (Table 4.5). The relatively large percentage of
capacity that would have to be shut in makes this ex-
tremely unattractive in view of the core's development
plans and revenue needs. In all probability, non-core
cartel members would be required to "share" some of the
excess capacity.
This simulation of the world, with a full stream
Iran, casts doubt upon OPEC's ability to boost prices or
to support a large scale NOC sales program. The surplus
capacity in the weak hands of non-core members would
create some downward pressure on prices. Core ability
to cut production levels may be limited beyond some
limit due to internal development needs for revenue.
The recent situation in Iran, however, has changed the
assumptions behind the above simulation.
If we constrain Iran to four million barrels per
day in the future, the residual demand is, of course,
much greater (Table 4.6). Iran's restriction of output
has given the cartel the ability to raise prices more
than anticipated even at the December 1978 meeting.
Its future production levels will determine much of
OPEC's ability to increase prices by curtailing output.
If the core does manage to keep output low enough
to maintain steadily increasing prices, it will ulti-
mately decrease the annual growth in world demand. The
resulting loss in the residual to the core (Tables 4.7
and 4.8) must be weighed against the greater per-barrel
revenues from a high-price strategy.
Implications
The role of residual supplier is inherently unde-
sirable, as it inevitably leads to fluctuations in rev-
enues, In the past, the system worked fairly well be-
cause Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the U.A.E., and Libya were
satisfied to absorb the bulk of production cutbacks.
The situation is changing, however, as government
expenditure commitments are increasing and production
levels are approaching the desired minimum for those
countries OPEC must be able to sustain tight produc-
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tion in the face of its increased revenue needs and
non-cartel increases if it is to maintain control over
the market prices of its products.
The question of revenue needs will probably pro-
vide the key to OPEC's future. NOC sales will give the
countries more control of and direct access to the
actual revenue flows. If the rent received proves to
be sufficient, OPEC will grow in strength as a cartel.
If it does not, and nations such as Iran increase produc-
tion to meet greater than anticipated revenue needs,
control may become more difficult and OPEC may have to
return to a world in which the companies act as the
cartel's agents.
Chapter IV Footnotes
1. Jaidah, Ali M., "The Pricing of Petroleum," Petroleum
Intelligence Weekly, Oct. 2, 1978, Supplement, p. 3.
2. Ibid, p. 2.
3. Ibid
4. Jaidah, Ali M., "Pricing of Oil: Role of the Control-
ling Power," Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, May 16,
1977, Supplement, p. 1.
5. Sampson, op.cit., p. 360.
6. "The Pricing of Petroleum," op.cit., p 3.
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CHAPTER V
OPEC AND ITS DEVELOPMENT NEEDS
The OPEC "core"--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the U.A.E.
and Libya--must assume the role of residual producers in
order to ensure that world supply remains tight. Because
increased NOC sales threaten to remove the international
majors from their roles as "buffers" for the producing
states, output must be curtailed to maintain crude values
above the official sale prices.
The question remains, however, as to whether these
four producers can balance the residual demand with their
growing revenue needs. The current account surpluses of
these countries have been decreasing over the past few
years as internal development needs have increased at a
rapid pace. Any future cutbacks in output will be
achieved at the expense of lost development programs
and internal growth. The core, therefore, seeks enough
income to finance the industrialization of their econo-
mies, a massive project that will last at least through
the 1980's,
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Revenue Needs
The OPEC nations need the foreign exchange received
for their oil in order to import enough goods and services
to build an industrial base. Without such an infrastruc-
ture, their economies would return to primitive levels
after the oil began to run out. These countries, there-
fore, are in a race with the clock to develop the physical
and technical capabilities necessary to rival Western soci-
eties,
The ability to develop can be measured with the
current account from the Balance of Payments. This is
simply the net exports of goods and services, after sub-
tracting "official transfers," or Grants-in-Aid. It
represents the "hard currency" accumulated that can be
used to finance imports of industrial goods in the future.
The sum of these current account flows over time repre-
sents the "stock" of foreign assets owned by a nation,
exclusive of financings by international institutions.
Theoretically, this stock of financial assets gives
the oil exporting country the wherewithal to become a
developed nation. As the domestic economy heats up and
absorbs more imports, the country loses the ability to
pay for these with current revenues. It then draws down
the stock of assets to finance the current account defi-
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cit. This continues until the country is "developed," or
is at least strong enough to borrow externally to complete
the process.
The current accounts for the four core members
demonstrate this stock surplus/high import growth pat-
tern (Tables 5.1 A-D). They have accumulated large
external asset positions and have increased imports at
a rapid pace, Eventually the current account surplus
will disappear as imports grow larger than oil revenues,
and the countries will have to finance part of their
needs from their stock of assets. The uncertainty for
these nations is whether or not the stock will be depleted
before their development programs have become more or
less self-sufficient.
The core's ability to finance these internal growth
needs is dependent upon future current account balances.
If we make the assumption that imports and miscellaneous
exports grow at historic nominal rates, we can approxi-
mate the revenue needs for the cartel core at different
points in the future. The difficulty in measuring "real"
imports necessitates the use of nominal values. This
implies that the real oil prices from Chapter IV will
have to be converted into nominal ones. By assuming
an implicit rate of inflation of 10%, we can accomplish
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this so that the current account will be completely in
nominal dollars.
If'we net the current account balance to zero each
year, we can calculate the oil revenues necessary to
finance development Table 5.2). Actual revenues, of
course, will be greater or less than this "residual"
figure. The difference is the amount by which the stock
of external assets is built up or drawn down.
The Cartel Core--Development vs. Cumulative Surplus
In order to promote internal development of
their economies, the cartel core will have to import
vast quantities of goods and services. This creates an
enormous need for foreign exchange, most of which must
be generated by petroleum revenues (Table 5.2). These
financial constraints must be balanced against alternate
price/output strategies, which will result in different
levels of revenue for the producers Table 4.3).
If we lump the requirements for the four core mem-
bers together, we can simplify the integration of revenues
and expenses. The total core revenue needs can then be
compared with the total receipts from residual produc-
tion. This avoids the problems encountered in allocating
output levels within the core itself and allows us to
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consider the four as one cohesive unit.
The receipts and expenses are compared for each of
the three cases of price/demand projections (Table 5.3).
The net surplus o deficit on current account is added
to the existing stock of external assets to determine
the cumulative surplus. As long as this figure is
positive, the countries can finance their development
needs from their own sources.
In each case, the accumulated earnings are insuf-
ficient to cover the projected levels of imports by the
mid-1980's. The countries, therefore, have two basic
options. They can either slash the development pro-
grams or go to international capital markets to cover
the deficit on current account,
If the core reduces its demand for imports, the
financial squeeze can be eased at the expense of lost
improvements in domestic quality of life. To be sure,
the Islamic Revolution would suggest some deceleration
of the industrialization trend as militant groups demand
a return to the "old ways." The ruling classes in mon-
archies suchi as Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. would be
particularly sensitive to these potential pressures.
It appears, however, thatthe need for internal develop-
ment programs will remain strong in any case, as evi-
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denced by the relatively high (4000-4700 TBD) production
of Iran in recent weeks. This output will pay for a
new budget designed to return the local economy to for-
mer levels of prosperity.
The option of borrowing on international markets,
therefore, seems to be the more reasonable choice. In
order to acquire these loans, the core will have to keep
production levels up to satisfy the financial community
and will have to invest the funds in projects that pro-
mise good returns. This implies that the infrastructure
needs will have to be largely satisfied and that the
countries should be relatively close to industrialization.
Iii view of the sadly deficient levels of education
and skills in the OPEC world, it is unlikely that any of
the core members will be near this modernized state by
the mid-to-late 1980's. They will have to stretch their
day of borrowing out further by decreasing the rate of
import absorption and hope that the domestic product
will pick up the slack. Similarly, they will have to
find ways to maximize the incoming revenue stream.
Implications
In view of OPEC's financial crunch illustrated in
Table 5.3, the cartel will probably begin to raise the
-75-
real price of oil as soon as possible. Given the arbi-
trary nature of the model used to obtain the results,
the focus should not be on the exact optimum price path,
but on the fact that a vey high pricing strategy seems
to be better for the core. If this is an accurate rep-
resentation of reality, we can expect a rapid price
escalation over the next few years.
In any case, it appears as if the cartel core will
experience financial difficulties sometime in the mid-
1980's. After that period, these countries will have to
juggle their own development and revenue needs with the
task of controlling output to maintain the cartel. As
residual producers, they cannot reallocate production
to ease their situation.
This is precisely the role the major international
companies could play in world oil markets. Over the
years, these "impartial" participants have been able to
allocate production globally so that individual countries
could meet acute revenue needs for a period of time.2
The four core members could still keep the supply semi-
tight, but produce more than the simple "residual."
The problem is that NOC sales have grown to the
point where the majors are losing the discretion over
whether or not they lift crudes from some nations at a
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given time. They are being forced to purchase the "last
barrels" at official sale prices and must seek the most
profitable deals. This is counter to behavior which
would help the core occasionally expand output by cut-
ting into rivals' production.
The question for OPEC is whether or not they can
maintain cartel stability if the core producers are
forced to restrict output so that value is almost al-
ways above sale price. Given their financial constraints,
this may be extremely difficult in the mid-to-late 1980's.
If this is found to be untenable, there are few
other options open to the cartel, They can work toward
a complex pricing scheme by which all sales are updated
at least monthly. Not only is this choice infeasible,
however, but is almost impossible to enforce. Simi-
larly, they could encounter equivalent problems in
designing some "equitable" allocation formula.
Finally, they could choose a pricing path so
high that non-core members could be on the "backward-
bending" part of the supply curve, as they would not
have to produce that much tc receive "enough" revenues.
OPEC would probably be reluctant to pursue this policy
in view of the potential disastrous effects on world
economies Cand their sales) and because of the ever-
-77-
increasing appetites of most countries who would simply
maintain historic production levels and generate even
more rent.
None of these alternatives is as attractive as the
participation system in which the majors were given in-
centives to buffer the producers from market forces.
This gave each country the opportunity to produce rela-
tively more in times of financial need. The companies
thus served as OPEC's unofficial allocation system,3
In place of this allocation flexibility, the OPEC
states are resigning themselves to mandatory output re-
striction. The loss of freedom for the four core states
may eventually prove too great because of their revenue
needs and we may witness the eventual decline cf NOC
sales.
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1. Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, April 16, 1979
2. Blair, John M., The Control of Oil, Pantheon, 1976,
p. 362.
3. Ibid
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The rise in NOC sales is an important phase in the
cartel's development. It represents the beginning of
an era in which the OPEC states can effect control over
more than just the upstream ends of the industry. Yet
the problems these sales have engendered may cause the
producer nations to limit NOC sales growth and reinstate
part of the old system in which the majors controlled
world oil.
Sumnmary of Results
As NOC sales have increased, they have cut into the
excess crude supplies of the majors. Many of the firms
have been forced to purchase incremental sale crude on
third party markets in order to meet marketing require-
ments. In theory, this exposure should cause these firms
to react more quickly to changes in crude values and
create some allocation problems for the countries.
In Chapter III, we proved that the competitive sys-
tem is indeed changing. Companies--both majors and
independents--react to relative incentives by changing
the volume of of ftakes from one source vis-a-vis the
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other alternatives. Since 1977, when the firms as a
group began to be crude short, these reactions to changes
in value have become more pronounced. Because the com-
panies will not give OPEC the buffer they once did, the
cartel will have to maintain crude values above their
sale prices at all times.
The most effective way for OPEC to control these
realizations is to hold back supply so that demand will
place upward pressure on prices. Unfortunately for OPEC,
production increases are expected from outside the cartel
as well as from "non-core" members. In order to maintain
a tight supply situation, the cartel core will have to
perform the role of residual producer. The environment
of the 1980's will probably force these countries to keep
output well below capacity.
The core nations, however, have financial needs
that may make this mandatory restriction difficult.
Their internal development programs will probably not
be completed by the end of the 1980's, so much of the
annual growth will undoubtedly come from imports. Pay-
ment for these imports will require vast amounts of pet-
roleum revenues. Based upon simulated supply/demand/
price scenarios, it appears as if the core will experi-
ence some financial strains toward the end of the decade.
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These constraints may impede the pursuit of a "residual
producer" strategy.
Dangers for the Cartel
The cartel core has been resigned to this residual
producer strategy because one of OPEC's prime objectives
has been the institution of NOC sales programs. The wis-
dom of this decision is questionable in view of the anal-
ysis in earlier chapters. Environmental considerations
not included in these results add further to the dangers
inherent inY OPEC's moves.
The demand model constructed in Chapter IV gave a
fairly conservative estimate of price elasticities. If
the "true" elasticity is in fact higher, as some econo-
mists have suggested, the total world demand would be
even lower than the model indicates. Although the model's
predictions are in line with other forecasts (Table 4.4),
the long-term effects of the recent price rise are far
from clear.
The other recent phenomenon that could create plan-
ning uncertainties for OPEC is the possible resurgence
of Iranian production. The revolution created a shut-
down situation in which excess capacity disappeared and
the cartel was able to boost prices. Iran is already
back to over 4000 TBD and probably could go higher if
economic pressures warranted.2 The supply side problem
is further confused by the omnipresent, if somewhat un-
likely possibility that major new discoveries will be
made in non-OPEC lands.
The combined effects of the supply and demand prob-
lems could create a situation in which the residual to
the core is much less than that suggested in the thesis
simulations. This implies that the financial problems
could become much more severe for these nations. The
only solution for the core, therefore, is to find a means
of allocation that will allow them to maintain the price
level while producing enough to meet their revenue needs.
Implications
The cartel decision makers face tough choices in
the future. The fundamental trade-off is over the problem
of allocation: how to keep world oil supply tight if
the core produces as much as it might like. Because this
issue has never been resolved, the core has had to assume
the role of residual producer.
If OPEC maintains this "residual" structure, it
appears as if the core nations will experience financial
difficulties in the late 1980's. Even if they signifi-
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cantly raise the price of oil, their problems will be
only slightly ameliorated. The only manner in which
these countries will be able to generate enough revenues
to save necessary development programs is to sell more
crude.
The rise of NOC sales, however, prohibits such action.
The competitive markets fostered by the change in indus-
try structure necessitate the tight control of supply.
Otherwise, the values of given crudes may fall below the
official sale prices, causing fluctuations in output
volume and revenues. The price shading resulting from
these countries' attempting to regain market share would
be exacerbated by additional downward pressure from excess
supply crude.
Tight control of production is mandatory for the
existence of a NOC sales system. Yet the mechanism by
which it is achieved--residual control--seems unstable
in the long run. OPEC must find an alternate method of
achieving cartel control.
NOC sales are the manifestation of an attempt to
increase influence in international markets at the ex-
pense of the major companies. The countries wish to gain
"prestige" and to improve their knowledge and expertise
in downstream operations. Most of the benefits which
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accrue from such a strategy do not appear to be altogether
economic in nature. To be sure, the cartel will be able
to operate more efficiently if they gain greater under-
standing of markets. The direct rewards, however, are
more elusive.
The gains made in this area must be traded off
against the loss of revenues for the core producers.
Because the international majors had performed the car-
tel's allocation duties, the core had been able to pro-
duce more than the simple residual, as evidenced by non-
core excess capacity (Table 4.1). The participation
arrangements gave the majors the ability and incentive
to lend stability to the offtake programs. Occasionally,
these companies kept one or more countries "down" in an
attempt to prevent excess crude from entering world mar-
kets.
In periods when the majors have been in control of
world petroleum markets, prices have eroded only very
slowly. Given that these companies were faced with
perennial glut, they did a remarkable job of keeping
price levels up by holding production down. Furthermore,
they were able to allocate offtakes so that the revenue
needs of individual countries could be satisfied.
These companies' strength was derived from the excess
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equity and participation crude in their systems. OPEC
can regain the use of the majors as agents by returning
these firms to their former "crude long" status. Given
the "correct" incentive schemes, the majors can buffer
the cartel from swings in product prices and can allocate
production so that the core need no longer act as resid-
ual producer.
The key lies in the actions of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
and Abu Dhabi, three of the countries which rapidly in-
creased NOC sales (Table 2.1). In the long term, these
core states must increase offtake volumes in order to
generate additional revenues. Yet their increases of
state sales have created an environment in which they
must keep potential production in the ground. If they
cut back on NOC sales and let the majors buy more crude
at discount prices, their roles will be changed.
By allowing the majors to be "crude long" again,
the core can shrug off the burden of being a residual
producer. The improved position of the companies will
allow them to be more "discriminating" in designing
lifting programs. Because the participation volumes
eliminate the high-cost incremental barrel, the majors
will no longer be required to shop around among sellers.
Even if non-core producers shade prices, there is no
guarantee that they can sell all they want.
The surplus participation crude gives the companies
both the ability and the motivation to allocate worldwide
production. They have relatively large margins on this
crude and would prefer to produce as much as they can.
The majors balance this desire against the oil pushed
onto markets by the Type I NOC's. They use their down-
stream strengths to maximize the volumes of participation
crude and minimize those of sale crude, within limits.
If the majors allocated offtakes, therefore, they would
lift more than the simple residual from the core by
cutting back on offtakes from other sources.
The increased revenues for the cartel core will be
achieved at the direct expense of the NOC sales programs.
In view of the financial rewards possible with the majors'
control over allocation, the more esoteric benefits of
NOC sales may pale in comparison. The core, therefore,
may be expected to cut back on their programs in order
to give the companies increased leverage.
The majors, however, no longer enjoy the same con-
trol over downstream channels that they once did. The
rise of consumer NOC's is an example of this erosion of
market power. These companies, such as ENI, buy directly
from the producer NOC's and circumvent the channels of
the majors. Since there is no reason to believe that
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this trend in state-to-state deals will be stopped, NOC
sales will continue to have outlets out of the control
of the international majors.
What may dry up, however, is the increase in NOC
sales from the core and a few other OPEC states. Countries
which recognize the need for cartel control and their
own inability to allocate production will be less reluc-
tant to forego their sales programs in favor of modified
concessionary agreements. The "sacrifice" of total con-
trol over production is offset by the gains to be made
in long-run cartel stability.
The increased volumes of system crude will allow
the majors to reinstate long term contracts with third
party customers. This will give them effective control
over marketing outlets, even if they do not "own" them.
The resulting power over the independents will offset some
of the effects of NOC sales sourced from spender" nations.
If the majors' return to a crude long state does
reduce the pressure on the cartel core, the growth in
NOC sales will be damped. These sales do provide an op-
portunity for the cartel to learn more about downstream
operations and give OPEC the flexibility to use its own
outlets rather than rely on the Western companies. Un-
fortunately, these sales create an environment in which
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the cartel core is forced to pursue a residual strategy
which may lead to financial difficulties.
The core, therefore, may reduce its emphasis on
promoting these sales programs and focus on an allocation
system based on the majors. This will permit them to
earn more revenues than they otherwise would. The in-
creased reliance on the majors, however, does not signal
the end of NOC sales. Although the growth may die down,
these sales will remain as a valuable outlet for the
cartel's crude.
-89-
Chapter VI Footnotes
1. Pindyck, Robert S., "Interfuel Substitution and the
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Comparison. M.I.T. Energy Laboratory Working Paper
no. MIT-EL 77-026 WP.
2. Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, April 16, 1979.
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NET CRUDE SOLD OUTSIDE
CHANNELS OF MAJORS (TBD)
1973
Selected Middle East
Abu Dhabi
Iran
Kuwait
Qatar
Saudi
Dubai
Oman
Iraq
Total Middle East
Selected Africa
Libya
Nigeria
Gabon
Algeria
Total Africa
Total World
(Excl. NA & Communist
Bloc)
198
982
0
15
166
75
17
1205
3280
786
166
160
958
2449
8544
NOTE: Derived From Tables 2.2(A-E)
Net Crude = Total Country
-Majors' Production in
Country
Source: Annual Reports,
BP Statistical Review
1974 1975 1976 1977
700
1711
949
207
592
108
23
1856
6830
826
2326
946
240
946
110
25
1771
7748
450
1111
124
97
501
82
18
1031
4098
588
243
200
908
2326
9532
457
1272
608
217
604
87
16
1541
5516
694
464
201
838
2653
11,612
1013
787
212
877
3347
1125
757
223
934
3628
14,415 16,474
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TABLE 2.3
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MAJORS' PRODUCT SALES
1973
Exxon
Mobil
Socal
Texaco
Gulf
Royal Dutch
BP
CFP
Occidental
Continental
Marathon
ARCO
Sohio
6178
2451
2259
3472
1791
5809
2200
1172
160
654
261
896
385
Source: Annual Reports
(TBD)
1976 19771974
5505
2227
2184
3446
1673
5042
1920
1174
93
611
280
802
333
1975
4990
2211
2116
3241
1610
4610
1760
1132
48
594
307
761
351
5353
2264
2339
3277
1609
4642
1920
1187
42
592
368
811
403
5266
2299
2455
3227
1669
4676
1933
1184
0
601
488
829
407
TABLE 2.4 -110-
NET CRUDE SALES OF MAJORS (TBD)
(CRUDE - PRODUCT SALES)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Exxon (499) (12) (541) (317) (502)
Mobil (28) 130 (67) (210) (21)
Socal 1382 1525 811 1122 868
Texaco 863 861 359 591 565
Gulf 1221 912 343 121 (58)
Royal Dutch (1049) (632) (1066) (1296) (1385)
BP 2580 2520 1680 1620 1457
CFP 162 275 130 32 (49)
Occidental 228 248 224 231 376
Continental (38) (60) (84) (31) (50)
Marathon 180 S97 44 29 (96)
ARCO (240) (207) (168) (300) (265)
Sohio (334) (281) (301) (362) (224)
NET 4428 5376 1364 1239 616
Source: Annual Reports
Tables 2.2(A-E), 2.3
TABLE 2.5
EUROPEAN YIELD
STRUCTURE & ASSOCIATED REVENUES
Yield(%)
20
10
25
20
.25
$/Bbl
1Q77
16.79
16.31
15.97
13.73
11.91
1Q77
3.36
1.63
3.99
2.75
2.98
Source: Petroleum Intelligence
Weekly
-111--
Product
Mogas
DP KERO
ADO
HFO-LS
HFO-HS
TABLE 2.6
MAJORS' INCENTIVES
VIS-A-VIS INDEPENDENTS ($/Bbl)
Indonesia
Minas
0.15
0.15
0.15
1.25
1.25
1.25
1.30
1.30
1.30
1.30
1.30
-112-
Nigeria
Bonny
0.47
0.50
0.36
0.30
0.32
0.42
0.44
0.51
0.60
0.39
0.48
Iran
Light
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.15
0.15
0.15
Source: Petroluem Intelligence
Weekly
Saudi
Light
6/75
10/75
1/76
4/76
7/76
10/76
1/77
7/77
1/78
7/78
12/78
UAE
Murban
0.32
0.29
0.29
0.24
0.24
0.24
0.42
0.44
0.53
0.53
0.55
0.22
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
Libya
Zueti na
0.20
0.27
0.27
0.27
0.32
0.27
0.31
0.23
0.30
0.40
0.40
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TABLE 3.4
CALCULATION OF THE "TRADE-WEIGHTED" INCENTIVE
$/Bbl for 1Q78
ColA Col B ColC
Country/Crude Incentive
Volumes of
Crude(TBD)2
Pct of
Column B
Relative
Incentive
A*C (A+O. 321)
Iran Light
Kuwait
U.A.E. Murban
(0.15)
(0.09)
(0.17)
5197
2096
1832
23.5
9.5
8.3
(0.0353) 0.17
(0.0086) 0.23
(0.0141) 0.15
Nigerian Light
Algerian Saharan
Libya Zuetina
N. Sea Ekofisk
Iraq Basrah
Ven. Tia Juana
(0.56)
(0.75)
(0.59)
(0.32)
(0.05)
(0.71)
1911
1225
1990
1410
2629
2163
8.7
5.5
9 .0
6.4
11.9
9.8
(0.0487) (0.24)
(0.0413) (0.43)
(0.0531) (0.27)
(0.0205) 0.00
(0.0060) 0.27
(0.0696) (0.39)
Indonesia Minas (0.32) 1635 7.4 (0.0237)
22,088 100.0 (0.321)
[Trade-Weighted
Incenti ve]
From Table 3.3
2Volume Produced by Country (1978) from
Petroleum Intelliqence Weekly
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TABLE 3.6
CHANGE IN OFFTAKE VS. RELATIVE INCENTIVE
IRAQ
(Coll)
Total
Production(Q)
2231
2000
1613
2283
2833
2250 .
2267
2233
2400
2367
2433
2650
3067
(Co12)
Moving
Average(MA):
Qt-l +Qt+Qt+
3
1948
1965
2243
2455
2450
2250
2300
2333
2400
2483
2717
(CoU)
Change in
Moving Average
(AQ):
MAt-MAt 1
17
278
212
(5)
(200)
50
33
67
83
234
(Co4)
Relative1
Incentive
(RI)
0.27
0.28
0.22
0.16
(0.05)
(0.02)
0.23
0.28
0.19
0.10
0.'7
0.00
(ColS)
Moving Average
(Rel. Inc.)
RIt + RIt,1
2
0.28
0.25
0.19
0.11
(0.04)
0.11
0.26
0.23
0.15
0.14
0.09
1 From Table 3.5
4Q75
1Q76
2Q76
3Q76
4076
1Q77
2Q77
3Q77
4Q77
1Q78
2Q78
3Q78
4Q78
!u-n Intelligence~7~:Source: Petroli
Weekly
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TABLE 3.7
CHANGE IN OFFTAKE VS. REATIVE I.CENTIVE
LIBYA
(Col)
Total1
Production(Q)
584
786
1269
1161
1170
1243 .
1259
1276
1346
1390
1358
1380
1338
1255
1315
1393
(Co2)
Moving
Average (A):
Qt-l+Qt+Qt+l
3
880
1072
1200
1212
1224
1259
1294
1337
1365
1376
1359
1324
1303
1321
(Cou3)
Change in
Moving Average
(AQ)
MAt- At-l
192
128
12
12
35
35
43
28
11
(17)
;35)
(21)
18
(Col.4)
Rel ative2
Incentive
(RI)
(0.09)
0.23
0.83
0.87
0.41
0.56
0.33
0. G
(0.14)
(0.01 )
(0.29)
(0.42)
(0.26)
0.06
0.23
0.66
(Col.5)
Moving Average
(Rel. Inc.)
RIt + RIt l
2
0.07
0.53
0.85
0.64
0.49
0.45
0.21
(0.03)
(0.07)
(0.15)
(0'.36)
(0.34)
(0.10)
0.15
0.45
Linoco Production Only
2From Table 3.5
Source: Petroleum Intelliqence
Weekly
1Q75
2Q75
3Q75
4Q75
1Q76
2Q76
3Q76
4Q76
1Q77
2Q77
3Q77
4Q77
1Q78
2Q78
3Q78
4Q78
_ - -
_ __ ___
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TABLE 3.8
CHANGE IN OFFTAKE VS. RELATIVE INCENTIVE
NIGERIA
(Coll )
Total 1
Production(Q)
1007
876
968
1064
1111
1142
1101
1184
1213
1224
1115
1043
860
967
1115
1200
(Col2)
Yovi ng
Average(MA):
Qt l+Q t+t+l
3
950
969
1048
1106
1118
1142
1166
1207
1184
1127
1006
957
647
1094
(Co3)
Change in
Moving Average
(AQ)
MA tA t- 1
19
79
58
12
24
24
41
(23)
(57)
(121)
(49)
(310)
447
(C0t4)
Relative2
Incentive
(RI)
0.12
0.10
0.35
0.33
0.01
0.13 
(0.04)
(0.28)
(0.22)
(0.09)
(0.43)
(0.51)
(0.23)
0.28
0.45
1.17
(Co15)
Moving Average
(Rel. Inc.)
RIt-l +RIt
2
0.11
0.23
0.34
0.17
0.07
0.05
(0.16)
(0.25)
(0.16)
(0.26)
(0.47)
(0.37)
0.03
0.37
0.81
1NNOC Production Only
2Frorn Table 3.5
Source: Petroleum
Weekly
Intelliqence
1Q75
2Q75
3Q75
4Q75
1Q76
2Q76
3Q76
4Q76
1Q77
2Q77
3Q77
4Q77
1Q78
2Q78
3Q78
4Q78
-
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TABLE 3.9
INDEX OF "LIFTING INTENSITY"
(Coll) (Co.2)
RI + RI_ 1
AQ 0 2
17
278
212
(5)
(200)
50
33
67
83
234
255
0.28
0.25
0.19
O.11
(0.04)
0.11
0.26
0.23
0.15
0.14
0.09
(Col3)
Lifting Intensity
Col(1)/Col(2)
60.71
1112.00
1115.79
-45.45
5000.00
454.55
126.92
291.3
553.33
1671.43
2837.04
Source: Table 3.6, Columns 3 and 5
2Q76
3Q76
4Q76
1Q77
2Q77
3Q77
4Q77
1Q78
2Q78
3Q78
4Q78
TABLE 3.10 -122-
INDEX OF "LIFTING INTENSITY':
LIBYA
(Coll) (Col2) (Col3)
RI + RI
R -I+---1 Lifting Intensity
AQ 2 Col (1 )/Col (2)
3Q75 192 0.53 362.26
4Q75 128 0.85 150.59
1Q76 12 0.64 18.75
2Q76 12 0.49 24.49
3Q76 35 0.45 77.78
4Q76 35 0.21 166.67
1Q77 43 (0.03) (1433.33)
2Q77 28 (0.07) (400.00)
3Q77 11 (0.15) (73.33)
4Q77 (17) (0.36) 47.22
1Q78 (35) (0.34) 102.94
2078 (21) (0.10) 210.00
3Q78 18 0.15 120.00
Source: Table 3.7, Columns 3 and 5
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TABLE 3.11
INDEX OF "LIFTING INTENSITY"
NIGERIA
(Col3)
Lifting Intensity
Col (1 )/Col (2)
82.61
232.35
341.18
171 .43
480.00
(150.00)
(164.00)
143.75
219.23
257.45
275.45
300.00
305.41
Table 3.8, Columns 3 and 5
(Co ) (Co2)
RI + RI 1
2
0.23
0.34
0.17
0.07
0.05
3.16)
(0.25)
(0.16)
(0.26)
(0.47)
(0.37)
0.03
0.37
3Q75
4Q75
1Q76
2Q76
3Q76
4Q76
1Q77
2Q77
3Q77
.4Q77
1Q78
2Q78
3Q78
19
79
58
12
24
24
41
(23)
(57)
(121 )
(102)
9
113
Source:
TABLE 3.12
OUTPUT CHANGES VS. SPOT PRICE DIFFERENTIAL
LIBYA
(Col.1) (Col.2) (Col.3) (Col.4)
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(Co.5)
Linoco
Production(Q)
584
786
1269
1161
1170
1243
1259
1276
1346
1390
1358
1380
1338
1255
1315
1393
Spot Price
F.O.B.
11.98
11.58
12.83
12.80
13.35
14.25
14.17
13.93
13.85
13.80
13.77
13.85
14.53
Official
Sale
Price
F.O.B.
11.20
11.20
11.20
12.32
12.32
12.32
12.62
12.62
14.00
14.00
14.25
14.25
14.05
13.90
13.90
13.90
Spot Price
Differential
Col2 - Co13
Output
Changes(AQ)
_9a tt-
0.78
0.38
0 .51
0.18
0.73
0.25
0.17
(0.32)
(0.40)
(0.25)
(0.13)
(0.05)
(0.63)
73
16
17
70
44
(32)
22
(42)
(83)
60
78
Source: Petroleum Intelligence Weekly
1Q75
2Q75
3Q75
4Q75
1Q76
2Q76
3Q76
4Q76
1Q77
2Q77
3Q77
4Q77
1078
2Q78
3Q78
4Q78
TABLE 3.13
OUTPUT CHANGES VS. SPOT PRICE DIFFERENTIAL
NIGERIA
(Col ) (Col2) (Col3) (Co1.4)
-125-
(Col5)
NNOC
Production(Q)
1007
876
968
1064
1111
1142
1101
1184
1213
1224
1115
1043
860
967
1115
1200
Spot Price
F.O.B.
11.81
11.60
13.05
13.11
13.27
14.45
14.45
14.28
14.05
14.00
13.89
13.98
14.63
Official
Sale
Price
F.O.B.
11 .40
11.40
11.40
12.60
12.84
12.89
13.10
13.27
14.33
14.33
14.63
14.63
14.33
13.95
13.87
13.97
Soot Price
Differential
Col2 - Col3
Output
Changes(AQ)
otz _l-
0.41
0.20
0.16
0.01
0.29
0.12
0.12
(0.35)
(0.58)
(0.33)
(0.06)
0.11
0.66
31
(41)
83
29
11
(109)
(72)
(183)
107
148
'85
Source: Petroleum Intelliaence Weekly
1Q75
2Q75
3Q75
4Q75
1Q76
2Q76
3Q76
4Q76
1Q77
2Q77
3Q77
4Q77
1Q78
2Q78
3Q78
4Q78
TABLE 3.14
OUTPUT CHANGES VS. SPOT PRICE DIFFERENTIAL
IRAQ
(Col. ) (Col.2) (Co13) (Col,4)
-126-
(Col5)
Pr oducti on (Q)
2231
2000
1613
2283
2833
2250
2267
2233
2400
2367
2433
2650
2067
Spot Price
F.O.B.
11.65
11.69
12.05
12.85
12.80
12.73
12.72
12.68
12.70
12.81
13.10
Official
Sale
Price
F.O. B.
11.74
11.95
11 .60
11.70
12.89
12.89
12.85
12.85
12.85
12.82
12.82
12.88
Spot Price
Differential
Col2 - Col 3
0.05
0.04
0.35
(0.04)
(0.09)
(0.12)
(0.13)
(0.17)
(0.12)
(0.01)
0.22
Output
Changes( Q)
~ Qt-Qt- -
670
550
(583)
17
(34)
167
(33)
66
217
417
Source: Petroleum Intelligence Weekly
1Q75
2Q75
3Q75
4Q75
1Q76
2Q76
3Q76
4Q76
1Q77
2Q77
3Q77
4Q77
1 Q78
2Q78
3Q78
4Q78
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PRICE ELASTICITY CALCULATIONS
l. Real price increase of 300% in 1973/74.
2. Consumption drops from 47,845 (1973) to 46,250 (1974) TBD,
or a decrease of 3.33%.
3. Assumption: A price increase will cause a long-term demand decrease,
50% of which will occur in the first five years.
4. Since a decrease of 3.33% occurred in the first year, 16.67% will
occur in five years, and 33.33% will take place eventually.
5. This implies a price elasticity of:
-33.33% 
300%
6. The price effect, therefore, will be slightly more than one percent
decrease in demand for every ten percent real increase in price.
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